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Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus: 
quantiﬁ cation of the extent of the epidemic, surveillance 
biases, and transmissibility
Simon Cauchemez*, Christophe Fraser*, Maria D Van Kerkhove, Christl A Donnelly, Steven Riley, Andrew Rambaut, Vincent Enouf, 
Sylvie van der Werf, Neil M Ferguson
Summary
Background The novel Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) had, as of Aug 8, 2013, caused 
111 virologically conﬁ rmed or probable human cases of infection worldwide. We analysed epidemiological and genetic 
data to assess the extent of human infection, the performance of case detection, and the transmission potential of 
MERS-CoV with and without control measures.
Methods We assembled a comprehensive database of all conﬁ rmed and probable cases from public sources and 
estimated the incubation period and generation time from case cluster data. Using data of numbers of visitors to the 
Middle East and their duration of stay, we estimated the number of symptomatic cases in the Middle East. We did 
independent analyses, looking at the growth in incident clusters, the growth in viral population, the reproduction 
number of cluster index cases, and cluster sizes to characterise the dynamical properties of the epidemic and the 
transmission scenario.
Findings The estimated number of symptomatic cases up to Aug 8, 2013, is 940 (95% CI 290–2200), indicating that at 
least 62% of human symptomatic cases have not been detected. We ﬁ nd that the case-fatality ratio of primary cases 
detected via routine surveillance (74%; 95% CI 49–91) is biased upwards because of detection bias; the case-fatality 
ratio of secondary cases was 20% (7–42). Detection of milder cases (or clinical management) seemed to have improved 
in recent months. Analysis of human clusters indicated that chains of transmission were not self-sustaining when 
infection control was implemented, but that R in the absence of controls was in the range 0·8–1·3. Three independent 
data sources provide evidence that R cannot be much above 1, with an upper bound of 1·2–1·5.
Interpretation By showing that a slowly growing epidemic is underway either in human beings or in an animal 
reservoir, quantiﬁ cation of uncertainty in transmissibility estimates, and provision of the ﬁ rst estimates of the scale of 
the epidemic and extent of case detection biases, we provide valuable information for more informed risk assessment.
Funding Medical Research Council, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, EU FP7, and National Institute of General 
Medical Sciences. 
Introduction
The earliest known human infections with Middle East 
respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) occurred 
in Jordan in March, 2012,1 with isolation and identiﬁ cation 
of the virus from a patient in Saudi Arabia occurring 
some months later.2 By Aug 8, 2013, 94 virologically 
conﬁ rmed human cases and 17 probable cases1,3–5 had 
been reported. Zoonotic exposure is suspected as the 
source of human infection, in view of the initially 
sporadic occurrence of cases together with the genetic 
similarity of MERS-CoV to bat coronaviruses.6 However, 
epidemiological investigations of cases did not ﬁ nd a 
consistent pattern of exposure to animals or the 
environment,7 and, as of Aug 8, 2013, the virus had not 
been isolated from any animal species. Recently, however, 
camels from Oman and the Spanish Canary Islands were 
discovered to have been previously infected by the MERS-
CoV or a closely related virus.8 The high apparent case-
fatality ratio in reported cases is cause for concern: as of 
Aug 8, 2013, WHO reported that 46 of the 94 virologically 
conﬁ rmed cases had died;7 this death toll is expected to 
rise since some patients are still in hospital.9
Although progress has been made in characterising the 
epidemiology of MERS-CoV, many uncertainties 
remain.10 Little is known about the extent of human 
infection or the degree of detection bias towards more 
severe cases. If the severe cases currently being detected 
represent only a small sentinel minority of a much larger 
number of milder cases (as occurred early in the 2009 
H1N1 pandemic in Mexico11), the case-fatality ratio might 
be substantially lower than what current surveillance 
data suggest. Conversely, for the severe acute respiratory 
syndrome (SARS) epidemic of 2003, little evidence of 
undetected mild or subclinical infections existed,12 even 
after detailed serological follow-up studies.13 In the 
absence of robust community-based serological surveys 
for MERS-CoV, assessment of the extent of undetected 
infection must rely on epidemiological inference. 
Another essential aspect of risk assessment is the 
characterisation of transmissibility, and a study14 
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concluded that transmission levels were under the 
epidemic threshold in detected clusters.14 However, since 
stringent control measures were implemented in many 
of those clusters, the transmissibility in the absence of 
such controls is still unknown.
Here, we undertook analyses of epidemiological and 
genetic data to assess the number of cases missed by 
surveillance, the detection bias towards severe cases, and 
the transmission potential of MERS-CoV with and 
without control measures. We also estimated risk factors 
for fatal disease outcomes.
Methods
Data, incubation times, and incidence calculations
The appendix shows further details of all methods used. 
We assembled a comprehensive database of all conﬁ rmed 
and probable cases up to Aug 8, 2013, from public sources 
(appendix). We classiﬁ ed cases with known epi-
demiological links as a cluster, with singleton cases being 
viewed as independent clusters of size one.
We estimated the incubation period from travel-related 
clusters. In the absence of other potential exposures, we 
extracted detailed information on the exposure of secondary 
cases to the index case from the medical literature 
(appendix). A lognormal distribution was ﬁ tted to the data.
We obtained an approximate lower bound for the 
generation time TG (mean time from symptom onset of a 
case to symptom onset of their secondary cases) by 
considering the average delay between onset of ﬁ rst and 
second cases in clusters with more than one case. 
A Gamma distribution was ﬁ tted to the data.
Since discovery of an index case prompts enhanced 
surveillance in contacts of that case, the occurrence of 
detected clusters is likely to represent a more reliable 
indication of changes in the underlying population 
incidence than the incidence of cases. We therefore used 
observed cluster incidence over time to study growth in 
incidence over time. An exponential growth model was 
ﬁ tted to these data and the doubling time of the epidemic 
was estimated (appendix).
We obtained an independent estimate of doubling time 
by phylogenetic analysis of seven sequences from 
diﬀ erent MERS-CoV case clusters (appendix). We applied 
Bayesian phylogenetic and coalescent models assuming 
a strict molecular clock and exponential growth of the 
viral population (appendix).
Using data of numbers of visitors to Jordan, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates who are resident 
outside the Middle East (denoted returning non-resident 
travellers) and their duration of stays, we estimated the 
expected number of symptomatic cases among residents 
in those countries from the incidence in travellers under 
the assumption that residents and visitors had an equal 
per-day risk of infection (appendix).
From estimates of the growth rate of the viral 
population derived from analysis of available MERS-CoV 
genetic sequences, we also estimated the total number of 
infections that occurred between the time to most recent 
common ancestor (TMRCA) and Aug 8, 2013.
Assessment of the transmission scenarios
We used the size of detected clusters to estimate the 
reproduction number averaged across all cases in 
detected clusters (Rcluster).
Classifying the case with the earliest onset date in every 
cluster as the index case, we also inferred the numbers of 
secondary cases infected by the index case (Rindex) 
probabilistically using the generation time distribution 
and timing of cases (appendix).15
We also ﬁ tted a model of animal-to-human and human-
to-human transmission to the incidence of clusters over 
time, and the cumulative incidence of returning non-
resident traveller cases, for diﬀ erent values of R 
(appendix). We modelled infection in an animal species 
that was assumed to seed infections into man. Animals 
infected other animals, whereas human beings could be 
infected by animals or other human beings.
Role of funding source
The sponsor of the study had no role in study design, 
data collection, data analysis, data interpretation, or 
writing of the report. The corresponding author had full 
access to all the data in the study and had ﬁ nal 
responsibility for the decision to submit for publication.
Results
Cases detected in the UK, France, Italy, and Tunisia 
caused seven secondary cases in those countries 
(appendix). We estimated the mean of the incubation 
period distribution as 5·5 (95% CI 3·6–10·2) and the SD 
as 2·5 (95% CI 1·2–11·6) days (ﬁ gure 1A), compatible 
with results from a study by Assiri and colleagues.3 This 
ﬁ nding suggests the mean generation time, TG, is 
unlikely to be shorter than 7 days.
For the six clusters (in France, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, 
and the UK) for which full data on symptom onset dates 
are available, the lower bound for TG has a mean of 10·7 
(95% CI 6·5–19·4) days and an SD of 6·3 (95% CI 
3·5–16·9) days (ﬁ gure 1B). In the following, we therefore 
explore values of TG in the range 7–12 days, while ﬁ xing 
the coeﬃ  cient of variation of the generation time at 0·45, 
based on estimates found for SARS.16
From the distribution of cluster sizes (average 2·7; 
range 1–26), and consistent with a study by Breban and 
colleagues,14 we estimated that R averaged across all cases 
in detected clusters (Rcluster) was 0·63 (0·47–0·85). We also 
found a trend for a reduction of cluster size with time: 
11 of 21 (52%; 95% CI 30–74) clusters were single case 
clusters before June 1, 2013, as opposed to 16 of 19 (84%, 
60–97) after June 1, 2013 (p=0·07), leading to Rcluster 
dropping from 0·74 (95% CI 0·53–1·03) before June 1, 
2013 to 0·32 (95% CI 0·14–0·65) after June 1, 2013. These 
changes could be explained by faster detection of cases 
and introduction of controls: the median delay from ﬁ rst 
See Online for appendix
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onset in the cluster to reporting of the cluster moved 
from 23 days before June 1, 2013 (n=14) to 8 days (n=4) 
after June 1, 2013. The estimate of Rcluster indicates that 
transmission is not self-sustaining in man once control 
measures are in place.
The reproduction number of cluster index cases (Rindex) 
was expected to be less aﬀ ected by control measures 
because of the delay between onset in the index case to 
the detection of the case and implementation of controls. 
This was particularly the case before June 1, 2013, when 
93% (13 of 14) of delays from onset to reporting of cluster 
were 16 days or longer. Analysis of clusters with complete 
symptom information on this time period gave Rindex=1·25 
(95% CI 1·00–1·50) for TG =12 days and Rindex=0·83 
(95% CI 0·67–1·08) for TG =7 days. A sensitivity analysis 
gave central estimates in the range 0·8–1·1 (appendix).
Figure 1C presents temporal trends in infection 
incidence using epidemiological data on reported cases 
and clusters. The analysis of observed cluster incidence 
over time indicates a doubling time of 90 (95% CI 
65–133) days.
The phylogeny showed substantial diversity, with 
sequences obtained from September, 2012, onwards 
falling into a single clade, and two older sequences 
forming a distinct outgroup (ﬁ gure 1D). The TMRCA for 
all seven sequences was June 27, 2011 (95% CI Sept 25, 
2010–Nov 8, 2011), whereas that for the recent clade of 
ﬁ ve isolates (clade 2) was June 11, 2012 (April 24, 2012–
July 18, 2012). The independent estimate of doubling 
time of the viral population in the recent clade (clade 2) is 
41 days (95% CI 17–234).
Using a best estimate of a mean 4 day stay for returning 
non-resident traveller cases (appendix), we estimated a 
total of 940 (95% CI 290–2200) symptomatic cases occurred 
in residents of these countries up to the end of Aug 8, 2013.
Using available MERS-CoV genetic sequences the 
median estimate of cumulative infections (in man and in 
the reservoir) that occurred between June, 2012 (the 
TMRCA of the recent clade), and Aug 8, 2013, is 5640 
(IQR 780–55 430). In deriving these estimates, we 
assumed a single generation time distribution, meaning 
the estimates were valid either if human-to-human 
transmission was self-sustaining and human infections 
therefore predominated, or if generation times in any 
animal reservoir were similar to those in man—in which 
case the estimates represented total infections in man 
and the animal reservoir.
On its own, a purely genetic analysis with few 
sequences can say little about the species within which 
sequence evolution is occurring, and, as a result, diﬀ erent 
scenarios for MERS-CoV are possible. The two older 
sequences could represent independent introductions of 
Figure 1: Epidemiological and genetic data
(A) Probability density and cumulative probability of the incubation period from data of exposure for a subset of seven cases. (B) Probability density and cumulative probability of the delay between 
onset of ﬁ rst and second cases in six case clusters with more than one case. The delay between onset of ﬁ rst and second cases is a lower bound of the generation time. (C) Cumulative number of 
conﬁ rmed cases and clusters detected of MERS-CoV. (D) Maximum likelihood phylogeny of viral sequences of MERS-CoV, obtained using PhyML with the TN93 model. More recent samples were found 
to cluster together (highlighted in red), suggesting these viruses are part of an emerging epidemic. Only Al-Hasa_1 was included in analysis, to avoid over-representation of this outbreak.
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the virus from an animal reservoir, whereas the more 
recent clade could represent sustained human-to-human 
transmission. Alternatively, the growth could be 
generated by an epidemic in an animal reservoir, with 
associated increasing incidence of spill-over infections in 
human beings.
Irrespective of the scenario, we can use estimates of 
doubling times to derive an upper bound for R. Under 
the assumption that growth outside detected clusters is 
driven by human-to-human transmission, R would 
remain close to 1: for TG =12, R=1·21 (95% CI 1·02–1·53) 
from an analysis of the ﬁ ve more recent sequences and 
R=1·10 (95% CI 1·06–1·13) from the timing of incident 
clusters; for TG=7, R=1·12 (95% CI 1·01–1·29) from an 
analysis of the ﬁ ve more recent sequences and R=1·06 
(95% CI 1·04–1·08) from the timing of incident clusters. 
We obtained similar estimates from the timing of 
incident cases (appendix).
Figure 2 shows possible epidemic trajectories of 
animal-to-human and human-to-human transmission 
for diﬀ erent values of R for TG=12 days. The proportion of 
human-to-human infections was about 30% for R=0·3 
and close to 100% for R greater than 1 (ﬁ gure 2D). 
Assessment of the probability that current chains of 
transmission will be sustained into the future (ﬁ gure 2E, 
appendix) showed that if R was greater than 1, then 
human-to-human transmission was likely to have already 
reached a degree in which extinction by chance was 
improbable. The analysis also conﬁ rmed that R was 
small (R≤1·17 for TG=12 and R≤1·10 for TG=7 days; 
appendix), but could not discriminate robustly between 
scenarios in which the virus was self-sustaining in man 
and scenarios in which it was not.
Our conclusion that case ascertainment had been low to 
date also received some support from analysis of the line 
list (appendix). Routine surveillance is likely to be biased 
towards the detection of more severe cases so that the 
case-fatality ratio estimated from these cases might be a 
substantial overestimate. We expect secondary cases 
detected via enhanced surveillance of case contacts to 
constitute a more representative sample of cases in 
general. Of those patients with a known outcome (fatal or 
recovered), 14 of 19 (74%; 95% CI 49–91) patients with 
infection detected through routine surveillance and ﬁ ve of 
24 (21%; 7–42) patients representing secondary cases died 
(relative risk [RR]=3·54; 95% CI 1·55–8·07; p=0·003).
Figure 2: Alternative scenarios for animal-to-human and human-to-human transmission
(A–C) Illustrative epidemic trajectories (incidence of human infections occurring in each transmission generation of length TG=12 days) consistent with the timing of 
clusters and data on returning non-resident traveller cases for R0=0·3 (A), R0=0·7 (B), and R0=1·06 (C). (D) Proportion of human cases due to human-to-human 
transmission in the epidemic so far as a function of the reproduction number, for TG=12 days. (E) Probability that current chains of transmission will be sustained for a 
ﬁ nite period (1 year) as a function of the reproduction number, for TG=12 days. See appendix for details.
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In patients with a known outcome, the probability of a 
fatal outcome was 77% (27 of 35; 95% CI 60–90) for those 
older than the median case age of 50 years; but only 22% 
(nine of 40; 11–38) for those younger than 50 years 
(relative risk RR 3·43; 95% CI 1·88–6·26; p=0·0001). In 
the 56 patients with data about age and about whether 
they were the ﬁ rst detected case of a cluster, 20 of 23 
(87%; 95% CI 66–97) of those aged older than 50 years 
were the ﬁ rst detected cases as opposed to 11 of 33 cases 
younger than 50 years (33%; 18–52; RR=2·61; 95% CI 
1·57–4·33; p=0·0002). This result was consistent with 
the hypothesis that cases in older patients were more 
likely to be severe, and that severe cases were more likely 
to be detected through routine surveillance.
Since June, 2013, we have noted a trend for cases being 
less likely to be fatal (ﬁ gure 3), but this trend cannot be 
fully resolved yet because of the uncertainty about those 
patients who are still in hospital. However, we noted that 
the diﬀ erence would remain signiﬁ cant even if 70% of 
those in hospital died (RR 1·71; 95% CI 1·04–2·81; 
p=0·036). This suggests detection of milder cases (or 
clinical case management) has improved with time.
Discussion
In this study, we analysed publicly available 
epidemiological and genetic data to evaluate the extent of 
human infection, the performance of case detection, and 
the transmission potential of MERS-CoV with and 
without control measures (panel).
We used data on returning non-resident traveller cases 
to estimate the total number of resident severe cases in 
the Middle East. By comparing this number to the 
number of reported cases in the Middle East, we conclude 
that at least 62% of clinically apparent cases have been 
missed. This conclusion is indirectly supported by our 
independent ﬁ nding that detection of milder cases seems 
to have improved in recent months. Since the four 
returning non-resident traveller cases were clinically 
severe, this ﬁ rst analysis reﬂ ects missed severe clinical 
cases. This contrasts with the genetic analysis that 
estimates the number of all infections in both man and 
animals (albeit assuming the generation time of infection 
in the same in all species). The larger estimates obtained 
from the genetic analysis might therefore be explained 
by the presence of milder cases or, alternatively, by a 
substantial number of infections occurring in animals.
Implicit in the estimation of the cumulative number of 
cases from returning non-resident traveller cases is an 
assumption that visitor and resident populations have a 
similar composition in terms of age, sex, and prevalence 
of comorbidities that might increase either susceptibility 
to infection or the risk of severe disease. If their 
demographic composition or health characteristics put 
visitors at greater risk of severe disease than residents, 
then this approach might overestimate case numbers in 
the resident population. If the epidemic is driven by 
human-to-human transmission, it is plausible that 
visitors might have a lower risk of infection than locals 
(because of inhomogeneous mixing patterns). By 
contrast, in the alternative scenario of an animal reservoir 
such as camels,8 visitors could be at greater risk of 
infection if they were more likely to be in contact with the 
reservoir than locals. However, without better 
characterisation of risk factors for severe MERS-CoV 
disease and data on visitor characteristics, it is not 
currently possible to adjust for such potential biases.
Consistent with a previous study,14 our analysis of 
cluster sizes indicated that R averaged across all cases in 
detected clusters (Rcluster) was smaller than 1. This ﬁ nding 
indicates that chains of transmission are not self-
sustaining when infection control measures are 
implemented. The reproduction number of index cases 
(Rindex), which is less likely to be aﬀ ected by control 
measures, had central estimates in the range 0·8–1·3. So 
the scenario of R slightly above 1 in the absence of control 
measures cannot be ruled out from these data. We found 
that the size of clusters (and Rcluster) decreased over time, 
which might be explained by shorter delays in onset to 
detection and control. Other possible explanations 
include seasonal variations in transmissibility or a 
reduction in the propensity to investigate clusters when 
cases are detected. Collecting more precise data about the 
timing and nature of infection control measures would 
reduce uncertainty about R.
Both the analysis of the genetic sequences and of the 
epidemic curves suggested that an epidemic is under-
way either in an animal reservoir or in man. These 
analyses do not allow us to distinguish between these 
two scenarios and to determine whether MERS-CoV is 
Figure 3: Outcome as a function of month of symptom onset for years 2012–13
When onset information was missing, the date of symptom onset was estimated by subtracting 10 days (the 
median delay from onset to reporting in 2013, once the Al Hasa cluster had been excluded) to the date of 
reporting.
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currently self-sustaining in man. However, they can be 
used to derive an upper bound for R in the range 1·2–1·5, 
indicating that R cannot be much above 1. The growth in 
the rate at which clusters are detected could be explained 
by an increase in the reporting rate rather than a true 
increase in incidence rate (appendix). However, the 
genetic analysis, which is less sensitive to temporal 
variation in levels of case detection, suggests that the 
observed increased incidence of cases and clusters in 
2013 is not just a reporting artifact.
A caveat to the estimation of Rindex is that there might be 
a surveillance bias towards detecting clusters which have 
an index case that causes multiple secondary cases. 
However, it is notable that each of the four reported cases 
in travellers caused one or two secondary cases (mean 
R=1·75) on their return to their country of residence, and 
yet detection of secondary cases occurred after the 
identiﬁ cation of infection in the index traveller. 
Transmission probabilities might be boosted in 
populations with comorbidities in which many of the 
clusters took place; on the other hand, Rindex might 
underestimate transmission in the absence of controls if 
interventions were promptly implemented after onset in 
the index case.
Cotten and colleagues18 recently published an analysis 
of a large number of sequences. Many of these 
sequences were from the Al-Hasa outbreak, and so 
although very interesting, do not add to the population 
dynamic inferences. During late revision stage, we 
repeated our analysis with these new sequences. Our 
analysis is most directly similar to their ﬁ gure 3, an 
analysis of 11 representative sequences. We further 
removed two sequences (Al Hasa 8, so that the outbreak 
is only represented once, and Bisha-1 because of the 
controversy surrounding it and the encepha-
lomyocarditis virus), and added the new Paris 
sequence. Based on this new dataset, we estimated the 
molecular clock rate at 1·0 × 10–³ substitutions per site 
per year with 95% credibility interval (6·8 × 10–⁴–
1·3 × 10–³) that overlaps the estimates of Cotten and 
colleagues.18 Based on this updated analysis, the 
updated TMRCA for all sequences was Oct 23, 2010 
(95% CI Nov 28, 2008–July 3, 2011), whereas that for 
the recent clade of now 11 isolates was March 29, 2012 
(Nov 11, 2011–June 7, 2012). The independent estimate 
of doubling time of the viral population in the recent 
clade is 43 days (95% CI 23–104). Using available 
MERS-CoV genetic sequences the median estimate of 
cumulative infections (in man and in the reservoir) 
that occurred between March, 2012 (the TMRCA of the 
recent clade), and Aug 8, 2013, is 17 490 (IQR 
3902–94 507).
We conclude that a slowly growing epidemic is 
underway, but current epidemiological data do not allow 
us to determine whether transmission is self-sustaining 
in man. Our analysis demonstrates that the 
transmissibility of MERS-CoV in man is close to the 
critical threshold of R=1 required for self-sustaining 
transmission. If R is greater than 1, then the number of 
human cases we estimate to have occurred to date make 
it highly likely that self-sustaining transmission has 
already begun. If a human epidemic is underway, the low 
estimated value of R (<1·3–1·5) and evidence of severe 
infection in secondary cases from case clusters suggest 
that intensive public health measures around cases, 
coupled with improved case ascertainment, are suﬃ  cient 
to contain spread and reduce morbidity and mortality. 
However, an important caveat to this conclusion is the 
unknown extent of mildly symptomatic or asymptomatic 
infection and the role it might have in transmission.19 
Our analysis indicates a high proportion of infections are 
not currently being detected. The reported case data 
therefore probably represent the severe end of a wider 
clinical spectrum of disease, though a case-fatality ratio 
higher than 10% cannot be ruled out from present data. 
Paradoxically, a low case-fatality ratio might make control 
more diﬃ  cult, if mildly symptomatic cases prove to be 
responsible for most transmission.
Improved surveillance, international collaboration, 
and data-sharing are therefore crucial to reﬁ ning our 
understanding of the transmission dynamics and 
epidemiology of this novel human virus and of the risk 
it poses. The time window might be short for doing so: 
Panel: Research in context
Systematic review
MERS-CoV cases continue to be reported (150 conﬁ rmed cases at the time this Article was 
going to press on Nov 5, 2013), largely in Middle Eastern countries, but by far, the largest 
number of cases have been reported in Saudi Arabia. Evidence is growing that the 
MERS-CoV virus, or a closely related virus, has infected camels in Egypt and Qatar, and 
probably in many other countries throughout the aﬀ ected region. Without ﬁ nding the 
virus in animals, it is impossible to know the reservoir(s) of this virus and stop 
transmission from animals to man.
We analysed all publicly available epidemiological data up to Aug 8, 2013, provided by 
WHO7,17 from 111 virologically conﬁ rmed or probable human MERS-CoV cases distributed 
over the eight aﬀ ected countries and publicly available genetic data, assessed the extent 
of human infection, the performance of case detection, and the transmission potential of 
MERS-CoV with and without control measures. A PubMed search on Sept 24, 2013, with 
the terms “HCoV-EMC”, “MERS-CoV”, and “novel coronavirus” identiﬁ ed 27, 63, and 
279 papers, respectively. All relevant papers are included in this report. We also searched 
WHO, and the Saudi Arabia Ministry of Health websites and reviewed all publications for 
MERS-CoV published to date.
Interpretation
Our report is the ﬁ rst to estimate the total number of symptomatic cases from returning 
non-resident traveller cases and to quantify detection biases towards severe cases. Breban 
and colleagues14 found that in clusters that were detected and investigated, the 
reproduction number was smaller than 1. Since control measures were implemented in 
many of these clusters, transmission in the absence of control measures remained 
unknown. We did independent analyses, looking at the growth in incident cases and 
incident clusters, the growth in viral population, and the reproduction number of cluster 
index cases to derive upper bounds of R in the absence of control measures. 
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current selection pressures on the virus to evolve 
increased transmissibility in man are likely to be 
intense.20
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